Background paper prepared by Mr. Dennis Sammut, Executive Director, LINKS

and Dr. Theodore Karasik, Director or R&D, INEGMA

published on 10 September 2009

Introduction
After months of talks under Swiss mediation, the foreign ministries of Turkey, Armenia and Switzerland said a breakthrough had been reached. A terse press release posted on the web sites of the Foreign Ministries of Armenia and Turkey late on August 31 marked what many hope is the beginning of the end of a political and diplomatic standoff between the two countries that has been going on for more than fifteen years, but whose roots go back much longer. The press release announced to the world that the two countries had initiated "internal political consultations" prior to signing, within six weeks, two protocols, one on establishing diplomatic relations between them, and the other on development of relations.

Time for a Radical Change
For some years Turkey and Armenia have maintained some low key diplomatic channels of communications between them. A more confidant AK Party (Islamic Justice and Development Party) government in Turkey in 2007 started sending signals that it may be ready for a breakthrough. A change of President in Armenia in 2008 set in motion a series of steps that led to the August 31 announcement. In November 2008 Turkish President Abdulla Gul made a historic visit to Yerevan at the invitation of his Armenian counterpart Serzh Sargsyan, ostensibly to attend a football match between the two countries. In April 2009 the two countries announced that they had agreed on a road map on the normalisation of relations. There was a sharp Azerbaijani response and for a moment the Turks looked as if they were having second thoughts. It seems however that the process is now back on track.

In Armenia for weeks prior to the August 31 announcement there had been a sense of anticipation, accompanied by disappointment that the process had dragged on without results for months. There is opposition to the normalisation of relations with Turkey from revisionist hard line political elements spearheaded by the Dashnak Party – a well established nationalist movement that has big support amongst the Armenian communities in the diaspora. The Dashnaks formed part of a grand pro government coalition until last May when they withdrew their Ministers from the government and went into opposition citing differences on foreign policy as their main reason. Overall however Armenians feel that a lot of good may come out of the process, not least in the economic sphere. Armenia has been badly hit by the world economic downturn and the Armenian economy will benefit greatly from the opening of the borders with Turkey and better integration in the regional economic processes.

In Turkey also reaction has been mixed. Relations with Armenia are simultaneously a foreign policy and a domestic political issue. Nationalists who have been on the vanguard to resisting the genocide claims consider the deals with Armenia as a betrayal. Solidarity with Azerbaijan has been often cited, although there is no doubt that this is just a convenient stick to beat the AK Party government with. The deal with Armenia is the first foreign policy breakthrough of the recently appointed Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davitoglu. Davitoglu, for long one of the grey cardinals of the AK Party, emerged from the shadows in May, to spearhead an energised Turkish foreign policy of which many claim, he is the main architect, and which puts sorting out Turkey's relations with its immediate neighbors as a priority.

In Azerbaijan the reaction to the Turkish-Armenian announcement was subdued disappointment. The Azerbaijani government still sees any relaxation in its blockade of Armenia prior to a solution of the Karabakh conflict as a dangerous development that may ease the pressure on Armenia at the negotiating table. However the government is encouraged by some progress in the Karabakh negotiations and has in any case reconciled itself to the idea that Armenian-Turkish relations are on the mend and to the limits of Turkish solidarity.

The international community has been united in welcoming the Turkish-Armenian announcement. The U.S., Russia and the EU all issued statements encouraging the sides on. The Obama administration is particular keen for an early breakthrough. The large, and prosperous, Armenian community in the U.S. supported Obama in last years' presidential election, in return for a commitment to recognise the "genocide." Once in Oval Office, Obama, like all his predecessors, found that campaign promises to the Armenian community are difficult to fit within the broader U.S. national interests and back tracked. A Turkish-Armenian rapprochement will take the heat off the administration. Senior persons in the administration, including Vice President Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, worked the phones with Ankara and Yerevan in the weeks prior to the August 31 announcement, making sure everybody knew where the U.S. stood on the matter.

Impact on the Region and Beyond
The August 31 Turkish-Armenian statement concludes "The normalisation of bilateral relations will contribute towards regional peace and stability," and there is no doubt that it will, if, and it is as yet a big if, there is a similar breakthrough in the Karabakh peace negotiations.

It increases Turkish clout in the region and secures Turkey's role as a regional power that it longs for. In August 2008, as the dust from the Georgian-Russian war was settling, Turkey announced a new regional initiative, a Caucasus Stability and Co-operation Platform, with the participation of Turkey, Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Whilst many consider this initiative a non-starter, the improvement in Turkish-Armenian relations certainly takes away one of the major obstacles. Given the debate on the future of European security that is ongoing, the Turkish initiative can now develop into a complimentary regional process on Europe's southern flank.

With its Armenia issue sorted, Turkey will also now be able to concentrate on sorting out the other issues on its borders, including the even thornier issue of the Kurds and relations with Iraq, outstanding issues with Syria and Iran, and of course Cyprus. Under Foreign Minister Davitoglu one is likely to see a more active Turkish Foreign policy all round. This will involve a delicate balancing act between the United States and Russia in the military and political spheres, and between Europe and the Arab World in the economic and cultural spheres.

The opening of the land borders between Armenia and Turkey will boost trade between the two countries, and give Armenia a much needed break. For as long as the Karabakh conflict is unresolved however the impact on the wider region will be modest. The Caucasus is a pivotal area linking Russia to the Middle East and Europe with Asia. As long as Armenia and Azerbaijan remain technically at war the potential of the region is much reduced. Negotiations are ongoing within the framework of the so called Minsk Process, facilitated by Russia, the U.S. and France.

The backdrop to all the political and diplomatic activity is energy. The Caucasus has become an important transit route for the energy resources of Central Asia to the markets of Europe. Azerbaijan is itself a now an important oil producing country and Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan are either already using the Caucasus corridor to transport their energy resources or are considering to. Turkey has big ambitions in the energy field and is seeking to position itself as a market hub and conduit, connecting various energy producing areas with energy markets. So far all these projects have bypassed Armenia and whilst this has been an inconvenience rather than a major obstacle bringing Armenia in the process is desirable not least because as a stakeholder Armenia will not have the temptation to be a spoiler.

Some also consider the breakthrough in Turkish-Armenian relations as a defining moment for the Caucasus region and for security in a region that connects Europe with the Middle East. The process is however just starting and is frought with dangers and obstacles on the way. It will require a strong political will in both countries, and the constant encouragement of the international community. Setbacks in the Karabakh negotiations will make the process very vulnerable which is why progress on that front is now so essential.

Finally there is the impact on the Levant and the Middle East. There are substantial and well established Armenian communities in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The opening of the land borders with Turkey will facilitate trade, and one should expect a boost in trade between Armenia and Lebanon and Syria immediately that the borders are open. Over the last decade Arab and Muslim countries have balanced their relations with Azerbaijan – a Muslim country and fellow member of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), and Armenia, a country that has courted the Arab world and keeps a distance from Israel. OIC countries have overall supported Azerbaijan in the UN whenever resolutions connected with Karabakh are presented. The Armenian-Turkish rapprochement will probably result in a more nuanced OIC position in the future. GCC countries have over the last two years been looking at the Caucasus as a possible area for investment, and at least from that point of view the developments of the last days will also be welcome. Of primary importance to the region however is the evolution of Turkish foreign policy which the Armenian initiative represents: a foreign policy that is on the one hand more confident and engaging, and on the other hand a one that is learning the use of soft power, as distinct from air bombardments and troop incursions. For instance, Turkey's role in the Syrian-Israeli indirect talks, in which the current Foreign Minister was directly involved as well as the new peace gestures towards the Kurds are part of this trend. This may mean a more sophisticated Turkish approach towards Iraq and Iran in the future and that will be welcome by the GCC and other Arab governments